Is this group taking over the Democratic Party?

They eagerly attend “No Kings” protests, volunteer with their local Indivisible or MoveOn.org chapters, subscribe to anti-Trump Substacks, and form the backbone of most Democrats’ small-dollar donor bases. They watch hours of YouTube commentary from the likes of Jim Acosta or Meidas Touch, canceled their Washington Post subscriptions when the outlet capitulated to MAGA, and some even sold their pricey Teslas after Elon Musk’s infamous run as head of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE).

Older, whiter, college-educated Americans may not be a majority of the Democratic Party, but they are increasingly dominating its money, media, and messaging strategies. Now, as the 2026 midterm primaries ramp up and the 2028 presidential primary looms, the party risks over-indexing on this audience to the detriment of others, particularly the core groups that abandoned them in 2024.

A few years ago, as many in the Democratic Party prematurely celebrated the end of the Trump era, Washington Post columnist Jason Willick wrote:

“The most important U.S. political trend of this century is the march of college-educated White voters toward the Democratic Party — and of non-college-educated White voters toward the GOP. This trend hasn’t just changed election arithmetic; it has changed the way the right and left argue, pushing the Democrats to embrace experts, business and the status quo as Republicans grow increasingly at odds with established institutions.”

Willick went on to frame that trend as a problem for the GOP, but others have viewed it differently. Republican pollster Patrick Ruffini, who wrote a book about “the multiracial, populist coalition remaking the GOP,” has long argued that Democrats are over-indexing on elites. Last week, he laid that out again in his post-primary analysis of the Texas U.S. Senate race: “White voters are in the driver’s seat of Democratic primaries,” he wrote. “Much was made of a Latino vote surge in the Democratic primary, but in fact, turnout surged more in white counties, especially in white, college-educated suburbs. That was the key to James Talarico’s victory. The education divide is increasing white liberal control of the Democratic primary, jeopardizing the historic veto power Black voters have had in many primaries.”

Whether or not you agree with Ruffini’s analysis, the trend is visible across the Left. At “No Kings” protests, the largest series of demonstrations against the second Trump administration, older, whiter Americans have been dominant from Westchester to Bethesda. “Our children are so busy,” one attendee and grandmother explained to a local reporter at one such rally in DC last year. 

This distinct group is also driving audience growth and revenue for emerging liberal media outlets and influencers, from YouTube to Substack. While public demographic data is scarce for some of these outlets, several prominent Democratic YouTubers have told me their audiences overlap heavily and are predominantly men over age 50. Meidas Touch, which produces one of the fastest-growing liberal podcasts, is anchored by an audience of listeners over 45, according to Libsyn, a podcast advertising platform.

Many of the most successful liberal voices on Substack fit this demographic—think Heather Cox Richardson, Michael Moore, Jim Acosta, Jenn Rubin, Norm Eisen, Robert Reich, Joyce Vance, and Dan Rather. My somewhat cynical, not-data-informed take: it's hard to imagine anyone under 40 shelling out $5 or $10 a month to watch a live video of Jenn Rubin and Norm Eisen yakking it up. (If you’re out there, I’d love to hear from you.)

The trend of hyper-engaged grassroots Democrats being older, richer, and whiter isn’t new. After all, the median age of a Democratic donor on ActBlue is 68 years old. But as the Democratic Party’s new media and influencer ecosystem chases clicks, shares, and grassroots revenue, their easiest path to monetization runs through this audience.

If you agree that Democrats are spending more time speaking to this one group of voters than others, the implications are vast. How much more likely are these voters to turn out in off-year and primary elections? How much influence will they have on candidates’ policy platforms, making them more moderate, or more progressive? In the 2028 presidential primary, how much cash will they pour into their preferred candidates, and what kinds of candidates appeal to them most? Most importantly, if Democratic candidates and media outlets are heavily incentivized to target this audience, what audiences are they ignoring or speaking to less?

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